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Abstract 
The majority decision in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2016] 
ZACC 13 recognises a new form of actual authority – authority 
by representation. However, the decision is based on a 
misinterpretation of English law and is inconsistent with an 
extensive body of South African case law and the view held by 
several South African text–book writers. It remains to be seen 
whether the decision will be regarded as binding authority. If it 
is accepted as binding, the principle of agency by 
representation which it establishes will need to be clarified and 
developed in certain respects to ensure that it does not operate 
unfairly.  
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1 Introduction  
The authority to conclude a contract on behalf of another may originate 
from a variety of sources, including authorisation by the principal party, 
employment in a particular capacity, and delegation. The expressions 
"apparent authority" and "ostensible authority" have hitherto been used in 
this context to describe contractual liability arising by reason of the 
doctrine of estoppel: the situation in which a would–be agent contracts 
without authority and the principal party is unable to avoid contractual 
liability because he or she is precluded by the doctrine of estoppel from 
proving facts to refute the allegation that the "agent" had authority. In 
Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd,1 ("Makate") the majority of the Constitutional 
Court adopted a different approach. It held that the expressions "apparent 
authority" and "ostensible authority" refer to a particular type of actual 
authority – one arising from a representation of authority by the principal 
party – and, accordingly, it is incorrect to regard them as convenient or 
shorthand means of describing liability based on estoppel. Counsel in 
Makate were not asked to address legal argument on whether ostensible 
authority should be recognised as a form of actual authority and the 
majority judges, in reaching their decision, misinterpreted or ignored a 
large body of judicial precedent and academic writing. Ironically, it appears 
that there was no need for them to adopt the course that they did. Wallis 
AJ, in his minority judgment, had no difficulty in reaching the same 
outcome as the majority by applying trite principles of representation. 
2 The facts 
The applicant (Makate), employed by the respondent (Vodacom) as a 
trainee accountant, came up with an idea for enabling a cellphone user 
who has no airtime to send a request to another cellphone user with 
airtime to call him or her. Realising that his idea had commercial potential, 
Makate incorporated it into a written memorandum and sent the 
memorandum to his immediate line manager (Muchenje), with copies to 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Vodacom Group (Knott–Craig) 
and other senior executives. Makate explained to Muchenje that he 
wished to be remunerated for the idea and, if Vodacom was not interested, 
he would take the idea to a competitor. Muchenje undertook to discuss the 
idea with the Director of Product Development and Management 
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RD SHARROCK PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  3 
(Geissler). When the latter responded favourably, Makate sent the written 
memorandum to him. After the Department of Product Development and 
Management had discovered how to make Makate's idea technically 
feasible, Makate and Geissler met and agreed that if Vodacom launched a 
product in accordance with Makate's idea and the product was a 
commercial success, Makate would be paid a share of the revenue 
generated. Makate indicated that he wanted 15% of this revenue, but the 
parties agreed to defer to a later date their negotiations on the amount that 
he was to receive. They also agreed that if they could not reach 
consensus on the amount to be paid, the question of remuneration would 
be referred to Vodacom's CEO for determination. 
Based on Makate's idea, Vodacom developed a new service called 
"Please Call Me". This enabled a prepaid cellphone user with no airtime to 
send a text message to another cellphone user, asking the latter to call 
him or her. In an email addressed to staff and in an internal newsletter, 
Vodacom acknowledged that Makate was the inventor of the idea behind 
the product and praised him for conceiving of the idea, when his job was 
not related to product development. The product was immediately popular 
with customers and, in due course, generated billions of rands in revenue 
for Vodacom. Despite this, Vodacom did not negotiate with Makate on the 
amount of compensation to be paid to him for his idea. Instead, Knott–
Craig and Geissler dishonestly credited Knott–Craig with the idea.  
3  Legal proceedings 
About four years after the launch of the "Please Call Me" product, Makate 
(who, in the interim, had left the employ of Vodacom) instituted action 
against Vodacom for an order directing it to enter into bona fide 
negotiations with him to reach agreement on a reasonable remuneration 
for his idea. Makate based his claim on a contract between himself and 
Vodacom. In his particulars of claim he alleged that Geissler had actual 
authority to conclude the contract on behalf of Vodacom; alternatively, 
ostensible authority to do so. By the close of his case, Makate had 
abandoned the allegation of actual authority and relied solely on 
ostensible authority. 
The trial court held that Makate had failed to establish the requirements of 
estoppel and that Makate's claim had in any event prescribed.  
After both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Appeal refused leave to 
appeal, Makate applied to the Constitutional Court, which granted leave. 
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This court considered that it had jurisdiction to entertain the matter 
because it raised a constitutional issue (the interpretation of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 in the light of section 39(2) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) and it was in the interests of justice 
to grant the application.2 
The Constitutional Court upheld the appeal. Jafta J, who delivered the 
majority judgment,3 declared that Vodacom was bound by the contract 
concluded by Makate and Geissler and ordered Vodacom to commence 
negotiations in good faith with Makate for determining a reasonable 
compensation to be paid to him. Failing agreement, the matter was to be 
submitted to Vodacom's CEO for determination of the amount within a 
reasonable time.4  
Wallis AJ delivered a minority concurring judgment5 in which he agreed 
with the order made by the majority.6 However, he arrived at this outcome 
via a different line of reasoning.  
4 The majority judgment  
Jafta J identified the two main issues to be decided as whether the 
ostensible authority relied on by Makate had been established and 
whether Makate's claim had prescribed.7 He decided both issues in favour 
of Makate. The main points in his reasoning on ostensible authority were 
the following. 
The trial court's conclusion was that Makate could not rely on estoppel 
because he had failed to plead or prove facts giving rise to an estoppel.8 
This conclusion was based on flawed reasoning because it proceeded on 
the basis that Makate had raised the issue of estoppel. The trial court had 
"conflated ostensible authority with estoppel." This was incorrect: 
ostensible authority and estoppel, although at times treated as 
synonymous by our courts, are not the same.9 Actual authority and 
ostensible or apparent authority are "opposite sides of the same coin".10 A 
                                            
2  Paras 29-30. 
3  Mogoeng CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, Matojane AJ, Nkabinde J and Zondo J 
concurring. 
4  Para 107. 
5  Cameron J, Madlanga J and Van der Westhuizen J concurring. 
6  Para 108. 
7  Paras 31-32. 
8  Paras 42-43. 
9  Para 44. 
10  Para 45. 
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misrepresentation that gives rise to estoppel may also lead to an 
appearance that the agent has the power to act on behalf of the principal. 
This is known as ostensible or apparent authority in our law. While this 
kind of authority may not have been conferred by the principal, it is still 
taken to be the authority of the agent, as it appears to others. It is 
distinguishable from estoppel, which is not authority at all. Estoppel and 
apparent authority have different elements, barring one element that is 
common to both. This is the representation, which may take the form of 
words or conduct.11 
In Hely–Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd12 ("Hely–Hutchinson"), Lord Denning 
MR said: 
(A)ctual authority may be express or implied. It is express when it is given by 
express words, such as when a board of directors pass a resolution which 
authorises two of their number to sign cheques. It is implied when it is 
inferred from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case, 
such as when the board of directors appoint one of their number to be 
managing director. They thereby impliedly authorise him to do all such things 
as fall within the usual scope of that office. Actual authority, express or 
implied, is binding as between the company and the agent, and also as 
between the company and others, whether they are within the company or 
outside it. 
Ostensible or apparent authority is the authority of an agent as it appears to 
others. It often coincides with actual authority. Thus, when the board appoint 
one of their number to be managing director, they invest him not only with 
implied authority, but also with ostensible authority to do all such things as 
fall within the usual scope of that office. Other people who see him acting as 
managing director are entitled to assume that he has the usual authority of a 
managing director. But sometimes ostensible authority exceeds actual 
authority. For instance, when the board appoint the managing director, they 
may expressly limit his authority by saying he is not to order goods worth 
more than £500 without the sanction of the board. In that case his actual 
authority is subject to the £500 limitation, but his ostensible authority 
includes all the usual authority of a managing director. The company is 
bound by his ostensible authority in his dealings with those who do not know 
of the limitation. He may himself do the "holding–out". Thus if he orders 
goods worth £1,000 and signs himself "Managing Director for and on behalf 
of the company", the company is bound to the other party who does not 
know of the £500 limitation.13  
A "closer examination" of this passage reveals that authority is established 
if a principal by words or conduct creates an appearance that another 
party has the power to act on his or her behalf. Nothing more is required. 
The means by which the appearance of authority is represented need not 
                                            
11  Para 46. 
12  [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583. 
13  Para 48. 
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be directed at any person. In other words the principal need not make the 
representation of authority to the person claiming that the agent had 
apparent authority.14  
The fact that Lord Denning MR stated that "[o]stensible or apparent 
authority is the authority of an agent as it appears to others" is 
"significant", because this underscores the distinction between ostensible 
authority and estoppel.15  
Our courts have "sometimes conflated apparent authority with estoppel", 
which has led to their incorrectly "attributing the elements of estoppel to 
apparent authority". A case in point is NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce 
Company Pty Ltd16 ("NBS Bank"). In that case, after quoting the above 
passage from the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Hely–Hutchinson, 
Schutz JA said:17  
As Denning MR points out, ostensible authority flows from the appearances 
of authority created by the principal. Actual authority may be important, as it 
is in this case, in sketching the framework of the image presented, but the 
overall impression received by the viewer from the principal may be much 
more detailed. Our law has borrowed an expression, estoppel, to describe a 
situation where a representor may be held accountable when he has created 
an impression in another's mind, even though he may not have intended to 
do so and even though the impression is in fact wrong. Where a principal is 
held liable because of the ostensible authority of an agent, agency by 
estoppel is said to arise. But the law stresses that the appearance, the 
representation, must have been created by the principal himself. The fact 
that another holds himself out as his agent cannot, of itself, impose liability 
on him. … And it is not enough that an impression was in fact created as a 
result of the representation. It is also necessary that the representee should 
have acted reasonably in forming that impression.  
Schutz JA proceeded to state the elements of estoppel as elements of 
apparent authority. In doing this he "conflated ostensible authority with 
estoppel" and overlooked the observation in Hely–Hutchinson CA that 
apparent authority is the agent's authority as it appears to others.18 
Nothing in Hely–Hutchinson suggests that apparent authority may be 
equated to estoppel. The converse appears to be true.19  
                                            
14  Para 47. 
15  Para 49. 
16  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA). 
17  Para 25. 
18  Paras 50-52. 
19  Para 53. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal continued the conflation of estoppel and 
apparent authority in South African Broadcasting Corporation v Coop,20 
where it declared:  
The plaintiffs in a replication relied on estoppel, otherwise described as 
ostensible authority. A person who has not authorised another to conclude a 
juristic act on his or her behalf may in appropriate circumstances be 
estopped from denying that he or she had authorised the other so to act. 
The effect of a successful reliance on estoppel is that the person who has 
been estopped is liable as though he or she had authorised the other to 
act.21   
Apart from NBS Bank and subsequent decisions that have followed it,22 
there is not a single case referred to in our law that holds that apparent 
authority is estoppel.23  
In considering whether Makate had established that Geissler had apparent 
authority when they concluded their agreement, the trial Court incorrectly 
applied the test for determining whether estoppel was established instead 
of whether apparent authority was proved. Consequently its conclusion 
was "mistaken".24  
The question had to be assessed against the facts which emerged from 
the evidence and were accepted by the trial court. Vodacom had a system 
by which Makate's idea could be developed as a new service for the 
public. Crucial to the operation of this system was the authority conferred 
on Geissler, a board member of Vodacom, who had the portfolio of 
Director of Product Development and Management. He was empowered 
to consider new products and subject them to technical and commercial 
viability tests before accepting them as part of Vodacom's business 
offerings. He was Vodacom's front man in its dealings with new products 
and the successful introduction of a new product depended solely on 
him.25 He concluded an agreement with Makate to use his idea in 
developing a new product for Vodacom and to defer negotiations on 
remuneration.26  
                                            
20  2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) para 62. 
21  Para 54. 
22  Northern Metropolitan Local Council v Company Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 
SA 323 (SCA); South African Broadcasting Corporation v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 
(SCA); Glofinco v Absa Bank 2002 6 SA 470 (SCA). 
23  Para 70. 
24  Para 60. 
25  Para 62. 
26  Para 63. 
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Vodacom's contention was that although it had conferred enormous power 
on Geissler, he had not been given authority to bind it. However, this was 
not the issue. The question was whether, as it appeared to others, 
Geissler had authority to bind Vodacom.27 Jafta J elaborated. 
This question must be considered with the view to doing justice to all 
concerned. The concept of apparent authority as it appears from the 
statement by Lord Denning, was introduced into law for purposes of 
achieving justice in circumstances where a principal had created an 
impression that its agent has authority to act on its behalf. If this appears to 
be the position to others and an agreement that accords with that 
appearance is concluded with the agent, then justice demands that the 
principal must be held liable in terms of the agreement. It cannot be gainsaid 
that on present facts, there is a yearning for justice and equity.28 
When account was taken of Geissler's position in Vodacom, the enormous 
power he wielded in respect of new products, the organisational structure 
within which he exercised this power and the process which had to be 
followed before a new product could be introduced at Vodacom, there was 
only one appearance that emerged. It was that Geissler had authority to 
negotiate all issues relating to the introduction of new products at 
Vodacom, including the amount to be paid for a new product once it had 
been tested, approved and acquired by Vodacom. Owing to his technical 
skills, he was best placed to determine the worth of a new product.29  
Makate, accordingly, had established that Geissler had apparent authority 
to bind Vodacom.30 
5 The minority judgment 
The minority judgment delivered by Wallis AJ serves a twofold purpose: it 
identifies the obvious weaknesses in the majority judgment and it 
demonstrates how the court should have decided the matter, applying 
ordinary principles of representation.  
Wallis AJ agreed with the main judgment on the following points: that the 
key issue was whether Vodacom had represented that Geissler had 
authority to conclude the contract with Makate; that Vodacom had, in fact, 
made this representation; and that Geissler had ostensible authority to 
conclude the contract.31 Where Wallis AJ disagreed with the main 
                                            
27  Para 64. 
28  Para 65. 
29  Para 66. 
30  Para 68. 
31  Para 108. 
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judgment was in regard to "the juristic nature of ostensible authority where 
there is no actual authority". The acting judge pointed out that it is "settled 
law" that ostensible authority is "a form or instance of estoppel" and this is 
why judgments and textbooks commonly refer to it as "agency by 
estoppel". His disagreement with the majority view on this issue did not 
affect the outcome of the case but the majority view had "the potential to 
cause unnecessary confusion in a settled area of the law, which is 
undesirable."32 Wallis AJ listed the considerations which had motivated 
him to deliver his minority judgment.  
First, the issue was not debated before us and we were not asked to alter 
the settled legal position. Second, my colleague's approach is based on his 
understanding of the English law. That understanding, based as it is on a 
single sentence in a judgment of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in 
Hely–Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd and Another [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA), is 
inconsistent with the authoritative judgments of English courts. Third, his 
approach is inconsistent with the judgments of our courts since the early 
twentieth century as well as the views of our textbook writers. Fourth, he 
advances no reason of principle for adopting this approach and does not 
locate it in any constitutional imperative. Fifth, the enquiry arose only 
because of the erroneous approach of the trial Court to the proper pleading 
of apparent or ostensible authority.33  
Wallis AJ commenced his discussion by pointing out that estoppel is a 
wide–ranging and equitable concept that finds application in a number of 
different settings, including motor dealer cases, share dealing 
transactions, and vindicatory actions. The law reports contain countless 
examples of the doctrine's being applied. The acting judge was convinced, 
on both principle and authority, that "ostensible authority is merely one 
more instance of estoppel"; one that crops up frequently in practice when 
there is no express or implied authority. In some cases, ostensible 
authority coincides with implied actual authority, and in those cases actual 
and ostensible authority are (to borrow Jafta J's metaphor) "two sides of 
the same coin". However, in the case before the court it was accepted that 
there was no authority at all, express or implied, and so this took the case 
"into the realm of estoppel".34  
Wallis AJ's criticisms of the majority judgment were, in summary, the 
following. 
In the majority judgment, Jafta J rejected the trial court's view that 
ostensible authority is a form of estoppel and held that, although 
                                            
32  Para 109. 
33  Para 109. 
34  Para 110. 
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sometimes ostensible authority and estoppel have been treated as 
synonymous by our courts, they are not the same. In other words, 
ostensible authority is a form of actual authority.35 Jafta based this view on 
a single sentence by Lord Denning in Hely–Hutchinson 583, that 
"[o]stensible or apparent authority is the authority of an agent as it appears 
to others." Jafta J considered that this statement was incorporated into our 
law when Schutz JA cited it with approval in NBS Bank, even though, in so 
doing, Schutz JA mistakenly conflated apparent authority and estoppel.36  
Jafta was wrong in two respects. The first error was the suggestion that 
English law differentiates between apparent authority and estoppel. In 
English law, apparent or ostensible authority clearly falls under the rubric 
of estoppel and is treated as an instance of estoppel by representation. 
This is manifest from the leading cases of Freeman & Lockyer (a firm) v 
Buckhorst Park Properties (Mangal)37 and Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA 
(The Ocean Frost).38 The latter provides the definitive statement of English 
law on the point and, being a judgment of the House of Lords, is binding 
on all other courts. In a key passage,39 Lord Keith stated unequivocally 
that ostensible authority is nothing more than estoppel.40   
The second flaw in Jafta J's reasoning is the suggestion that Schutz JA, in 
treating apparent or ostensible authority as a form or instance of estoppel, 
was departing from the principles applied in our law before NBS Bank. 
Jafta J expressed the view41 that, prior to NBS Bank and the decisions that 
followed it, there was not a single case in our law which held that apparent 
authority is estoppel. This is incorrect.42 Our courts have, from early times, 
consistently taken the view that apparent or ostensible authority is merely 
an instance of estoppel, as is evident from a long line of cases decided 
before NBS Bank.43 Textbook writers44 have also taken this view.45 
                                            
35  Para 126. 
36  Para 127. 
37  [1964] 1 All ER 630 (CA). 
38  [1986] 2 All ER 385 (HL). 
39  389. 
40  Para 128. 
41  Para 70. 
42  Para 129. 
43  Van Blommenstein v Holliday (1904) 21 SC 11 18; In Re Reynolds Vehicle and 
Harness Factory Limited (1906) 23 SC 703 712-713; Central South African Railways 
v James 1908 TS 221 232; Welgedacht Exploration Co Ltd v Transvaal and Delegoa 
Bay Investment Co Ltd 1909 TH 90 106; Strachan v Blackbeard and Son 1910 AD 
282 287, 295-296; Peddie and Drummond v Heydorn 1913 OPD 102 104; Monzali v 
Smith 1929 AD 382 385; Lucey & Co Ltd v Martial & Son 1931 NPD 47 56; West v 
Pollak & Freemantle 1937 TPD 64 67-68; West v De Villiers 1938 CPD 96 103-105; 
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NBS Bank was the first of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal dealt with these issues. It concerned the authority of a branch 
manager of a bank to take investments from members of the public. 
Schutz JA cited the passage from the judgment of Lord Denning MR in 
Hely Hutchinson (quoted above) and placed the question of ostensible 
authority squarely within the framework of estoppel.46 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal, in a series of subsequent cases,47 had reaffirmed Schutz JA's 
approach.48  
Wallis AJ concluded:  
 [T]he [preceding] analysis … shows that in English law ostensible authority 
is an estoppel by representation and that the earlier decisions of our courts 
that say that ostensible or apparent authority is a form of estoppel are 
correct. That is also the view of the academic commentators … This 
characterisation was not and is not challenged on the basis that it is 
inconsistent with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. It should 
in my opinion be applied in this case. Therefore, once Mr Makate accepted 
that Mr Geissler did not have actual authority, whether express or implied, to 
conclude a contract with him on behalf of Vodacom, he had to show that 
Vodacom made a representation to him that Mr Geissler had the requisite 
authority and that he reasonably acted upon it.49 
In response to Wallis AJ's judgment, Jafta J had raised the consideration 
that his (Jafta J's)  approach regarding apparent authority and estoppel 
was analogous to the approach adopted in relation to the principle of 
"apparent agreement" (quasi–mutual assent) and the objective theory of 
contract. He explained. 
                                                                                                                       
Insurance Trust & Investments v Mudaliar 1943 NPD 45 58, 61-63; Clifford Harris 
(Rhodesia) Ltd v Todd 1955 3 SA 302 (SR) 303; Tuckers Land and Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14, 18-19; Inter–Continental 
Finance & Leasing Corp (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 and 57 Industria Ltd 1979 3 SA 740 
(W) 748; Southern Life Association Ltd v Beyleveld 1989 1 SA 496 (A) 503; African 
Life Assurance Co Ltd v NBS Bank Ltd 2001 1 SA 432 (W) 451; Glofinco v ABSA 
Bank Ltd (t/a United Bank)  2001 2 SA 1048 (W) 1064. 
44  The judge referred to Kerr Agency 112-148; De Villiers and Macintosh Agency 119; 
Joubert Verteenwoordigingsreg 109-115; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 101; 
Wille Mercantile Law 466-468; Wille Principles 991. Also see Sonnekus Estoppel 2-
3, 93-99, 124-125. 
45 Paras 140-143 and 145-149. 
46  Paras 150-151. 
47  Glofinco v Absa Bank 2002 6 SA 470 (SCA) para 13; South African Broadcasting 
Corporation v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) paras 64-66; MEC for Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism v Kruizenga 2010 4 SA 122 (SCA) paras 15-16; Northern 
Metropolitan Local Council v Company Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd  2012 5 SA 323 
(SCA) paras 28-29. 
48  Para 152. 
49  Para 154. 
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[I]f a person conducts herself in a manner that would reasonably cause 
another to believe that she was assenting to contractual terms proposed by 
the latter, and acting on that belief the latter enters into a contract with her, 
she would be bound as if she had intended to agree, even though that may 
not have been her intention … In our law this kind of contract is known as 
the apparent agreement because it does not have consensus as its 
foundation. What is clear though is that the objective theory of contract is not 
construed to mean estoppel, even though they both apply and arise from the 
same facts … I can think of no reason in principle or logic which warrants a 
different approach in the case of apparent authority and estoppel. Both 
apparent contract and apparent authority derive their existence from the 
conduct of the party to be held liable. Both form part of our law of contract. 
They come into being from what reasonably appears to be the position. 
Therefore, if a distinction is drawn between estoppel and the objective theory 
of contract in the case of the apparent agreement, the same should be the 
position in respect of apparent authority and estoppel in contracts of 
agency.50  
Wallis AJ was not convinced by this reasoning.  
[Jafta J's] suggestion [is] that my approach is contrary to principle and the 
approach our law takes to the doctrine of quasi–mutual assent. The example 
is given of a person who is held liable on a contract because they 
reasonably caused the other party to believe that they were agreeing to 
conclude a contract with them. That has on several occasions been treated 
as estoppel51 but in [Saambou–Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman52], 
Jansen JA said that it would lead to greater clarity to distinguish quasi–
mutual assent and the reliance theory of contract from estoppel. The 
problem he was addressing was whether our law of contract is wholly 
subjective and based on the existence of consensus ad idem (subjective 
agreement, which he referred to as the "wilsteorie" of contract53) or whether 
it includes objective elements, which he described as the reliance theory. 
This bears no resemblance to the issue that arises in relation to the authority 
to conclude a contract. In the former case the issue is a single one of 
whether there is any contract at all. In the latter there is a contract, but one 
of the parties claims that the person purporting to represent it lacked 
authority to contract. This involves two separate enquiries, namely, whether 
there was express or implied authority and, if not, whether there was 
ostensible authority. Whatever reasons there may be for distinguishing 
between quasi–mutual assent and the objective approach to whether a 
contract was concluded, they have no bearing on the issue of ostensible 
authority. The two situations are not in my view comparable.54 
In relation to the case before him, Wallis AJ could see no difficulty of 
principle or practicality in treating ostensible authority as estoppel. There 
had to be a representation of authority by Vodacom and Makate should 
                                            
50  Paras 72-74. 
51  Van Ryn Wine and Spirit Co v Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417 424; Peri–Urban Areas 
Health Board v Breet 1958 3 SA 783 (T) 790; Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 1 SA 418 
(A) 425. 
52  1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1002. 
53  993. 
54  Para 157. 
RD SHARROCK PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  13 
have relied upon that representation.55 Furthermore, the representation 
had to have been one that Vodacom should reasonably have thought 
would be relied on, and Makate's reliance on it had to have been 
reasonable. These requirements did not pose any difficulty on the facts. 
Lastly there was the issue of prejudice, which was obvious. For Makate to 
permit Vodacom to develop his idea in a false belief that he would be able 
to negotiate compensation for it plainly redounded to his prejudice.56  
Applying the above requirements, Wallis AJ concluded that Vodacom was 
estopped from denying that Geissler had authority to make the contract on 
its behalf.57 His reasoning was, briefly, as follows. 
Makate had acted upon the belief that Geissler had authority to conclude a 
contract with him. In view of Geissler's position in the company, that belief 
was reasonable.58 
The crucial issue was whether Vodacom had made a representation to 
Makate that Geissler had authority to conclude the agreement on its 
behalf.59 
For a company's statement or conduct to constitute a representation of 
authority for the purposes of estoppel, it must be that of a person or 
persons (such as a board of directors) who have actual authority to bind 
the company to the transaction in dispute. The conduct may include 
appointing an individual to a position ordinarily carrying with it a particular 
level of authority or permitting the putative agent to engage in a course of 
dealing on behalf of the company. A representation by the agent alone, 
without more, is insufficient.60  
The principal source of authority in Vodacom was its board of directors, 
but the executive directors were critically involved in the company's day–
to–day operations. The most important executive director was Knott–
Craig, who was the Group CEO of the holding company of Vodacom and 
the Executive Chairman of the operating company. Knott–Craig was the 
driving force behind Vodacom. If he approved a project, it would be 
undertaken. The product could be launched in the marketplace without 
                                            
55  Para 155. 
56  Para 156. 
57  Paras 108, 184. 
58  Para 158. 
59  Para 158. 
60  Para 165. 
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prior board approval, except where it would involve substantial capital 
expenditure.61 
Knott–Craig had at least ostensible authority to agree to remunerate 
Makate for his idea.62 He had used Geissler as his agent, in turn, to 
engage with Makate. That was entirely compatible with the corporate 
hierarchy.63 Makate did not question Geissler's authority and Geissler did 
not make any express representations to him about the scope of that 
authority. This situation was a case of Makate relying on the conduct of 
senior parties in the company's hierarchy that cloaked Geissler with the 
appearance of authority to conclude the agreement.64  
The board of Vodacom had represented to the world, including Makate, 
that Geissler had the necessary authority to conclude the agreement for 
remuneration with him.65 Knott–Craig had known in substance what was 
happening between Geissler and Makate and he had done nothing to 
make it clear to Makate that no agreement on remuneration could be 
concluded without reference to higher authority in Vodacom.66  
The consequence was that Geissler had ostensible authority to conclude a 
contract with Makate and Vodacom was estopped from denying that 
authority.67 
6 Comment 
As is evident from Wallis AJ's minority judgment, the majority decision in 
this case has significant flaws. Certain additional criticisms should be 
made.  
A major concern is that the decision flouts the principle of stare decisis. 
This raises the question whether the decision itself is to be regarded as 
establishing a binding legal precedent. A court is not obliged to follow the 
decision of a higher court if the decision was arrived at per incuriam, that 
is, without due regard to the law.68 Jafta J's view is an entirely novel one, 
                                            
61  Paras 167, 169-171. 
62  Para 172. 
63  Para 180. 
64  Para 181. 
65  Para 182. 
66  Para 184. 
67  Para 184. 
68  Trade Fairs and Promotions (Pty) Ltd v Thomson 1984 4 SA 177 (W) 185; 
Sealandair Shipping and Forwarding v Slash Clothing Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 2 SA 635 
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formulated without requiring argument on the point, and founded on an 
obvious misinterpretation of English law. It conflicts with a voluminous 
body of South African case law and the view shared by a number of 
textbook writers. Jafta J advanced no constitutional imperative and no 
reason of principle for creating a new rule of law (other than the 
consideration that the law governing apparent agreement should be 
analogous to that which applies to dissensus in the law of contract). It is 
trite that a higher court should not readily depart from a view adopted in a 
long line of earlier judgments69 and it stands to reason that if a higher court 
does this, it should provide convincing reasons why the earlier view is no 
longer good law.70 In this instance, the earlier view is supported by an 
extensive body of case law, spanning more than a century, and Jafta J 
provided no convincing reason in law or logic for departing from the settled 
legal position.  
A further criticism of the majority judgment (assuming it establishes a 
binding precedent) is that the principle that it introduces ("the principle") is 
a rudimentary one that will need to be refined and developed if it is to 
achieve rational and fair results. Authority is established if a party (the 
principal), by words or conduct, creates an appearance that another party 
(the agent) has the power to act on his or her behalf. No other requirement 
needs to be complied with. The representation of authority need not even 
be made to the third party who maintains that the agent had power to 
act.71 In the result, authority is created by representation alone: words or 
conduct which create an impression of authority in the minds of others.  
One of the difficulties that arises is that the principle does not distinguish 
between an intentional and an unintentional representation of authority. 
The doctrine of estoppel makes this distinction. It provides that where the 
representation of authority arises from unintentional conduct, the conduct 
must be "of such a nature that it could reasonably have been expected to 
                                                                                                                       
(W) 639-640, 641; Hahlo and Kahn Union 30. Cf Makambi v MEC for Education, 
Eastern Cape 2008 5 SA 449 (SCA) para 28. 
69  See, eg, De Villiers v McIntyre 1921 AD 425 432; Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling 
Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1939 AD 487 505; Phillips v 
Commissioner For Inland Revenue 1942 AD 35 50; The Mine Workers' Union v JJ 
Prinsloo; The Mine Workers' Union v JP Prinsloo; The Mine Workers' Union v 
Greyling 1948 3 SA 831 (A) 852; Holmes' Executor v Rawbone 1954 3 SA 703 (A) 
711; Hahlo and Kahn Union 30-31. 
70  Bosch v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2013 5 SA 130 (WCC) para 
103. 
71  Para 47. 
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mislead".72 The reason for making this distinction and applying an 
objective standard is that a court should not, in fairness, hold a person 
bound by "consequences which he could not reasonably expect and are 
not the natural result of his conduct" (Monzali v Smith).73 In Connocks (SA) 
Motors Co Ltd v Sentrale Westelike Ko–Operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk,74 
Trollip J explained: 
It is obvious … that to have regard only to the position of the representee in 
applying the objective test could in certain circumstances bear unjustly or 
unduly harshly on a representor, especially if he was innocent or blameless, 
and because the foundation of estoppel is still equity, our Courts have 
evolved a different approach in estoppel based on unintentional conduct in 
applying an objective test. 
Another weakness in the principle is that it does not allow for the 
possibility that a representation of authority may have no causal effect on 
the third party. If the principle is applied as formulated by Jafta J, the third 
party can proceed on the basis that the agent has authority to act, even if 
the third party has not been misled by the principal's representation of 
authority or ought reasonably to have known that the agent did not have 
authority. This is clearly potentially unfair to the principal. A possible 
solution may be to accept Jafta J's view that authority by representation is 
analogous to quasi-mutual assent and to apply the requirements of the 
latter principle in cases of authority by representation. For the doctrine of 
quasi–mutual assent to apply, the party seeking to uphold a contract 
without consensus must actually believe that the other party has assented 
to his or her terms, the belief must be reasonable in the circumstances, 
and the belief must be engendered by the words or conduct of the other 
party.75 If one applies these requirements, suitably modified, to authority 
by representation it means that the third party must actually believe that 
authority has been granted; his or her belief must be caused by the words 
or conduct (the representation of authority) of the principal; and the belief 
must be reasonable in the circumstances. Insisting on proof of these 
elements will ensure that a principal is held liable only if the third party has 
                                            
72  See, eg, Strachan v Blackbeard & Son 1910 AD 282 289; Monzali v Smith 1929 AD 
382 386; Connocks (SA) Motors Co Ltd v Sentrale Westelike Ko–Operatiewe 
Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 SA 47 (T) 50. 
73  1929 AD 382 386. 
74  1964 2 SA 47 (T) 50. 
75  See, eg, Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 1 SA 49 (A) 61; Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) 
241; Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 2001 2 SA 59 (SCA) para 
12; HNR Properties CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 4 SA 471 (SCA) para 23; 
Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) para 
17; Cecil Nurse (Pty) Ltd v Nkola 2008 2 SA 441 (SCA) para 15.  
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genuinely and reasonably relied upon the principal's representation of 
authority.  
It is regrettable that the majority judges in Makate saw fit to introduce a 
novel and problematic principle into the law governing agency contracts 
when a satisfactory outcome to the case was easily obtainable through the 
application of well–established principles. Apart from estoppel, it seems 
that the principle of "usual authority" could have been invoked to deal with 
matter. There is substantial case authority to the effect that where a 
person is employed in a particular position or engaged to carry out a 
particular task, it is implied that he or she has the actual authority to 
perform juristic acts that are usually or customarily vested in such an 
agent.76 This authority enables the agent to perform juristic acts which are 
necessary for, or reasonably incidental to, the due execution of his or her 
duties or the task assigned to him or her.77 In the matter under 
consideration, it seems obvious that Geissler, given his position in 
Vodacom, the extensive powers afforded to him in relation to product 
development, and the organisational structure and internal processes of 
Vodacom, would at the very least have had implied authority to agree on 
the remuneration for which a new product would be acquired by Vodacom. 
Geissler was, as Jafta J observed, "best placed to determine the worth of 
a new product". As such he must have had implied authority to make the 
contract that he concluded with Makate.  
7 Conclusion  
The majority decision in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd recognises a new 
form of actual authority – authority by representation. As explained in the 
minority judgment, the view taken by the majority judges is based on a 
misinterpretation of English law and is inconsistent with an extensive body 
of South African case law and the view shared by several text–book 
writers. It remains to be seen whether the decision will be regarded as 
                                            
76  See, eg, Strachan v Blackbeard & Son 1910 AD 282 288; Reed v Sager"s Motors 
(Pvt) Ltd 1970 1 SA 521 (RA) 524-525; Inter–Continental Finance and Leasing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 and 57 Industria Ltd 1979 3 SA 740 (W) 748; 
Glofinco v Absa Bank Ltd (t/a United Bank) 2001 2 SA 1048 (W) 1058-1060. 
77  See, eg, Natal Bank Ltd v Parsons 1906 TH 102 112; Maytham v Logan 1917 SR 80 
84; Nel v South African Railways and Harbours 1924 AD 30 42-43; Heidrich v 
Henckert 1930 SWA 26 28; Mahomed v Padayachey 1948 1 SA 772 (A); Covary v 
Registrar of Deeds 1948 3 SA 183 (C) 189; Clifford Harris (Rhodesia) Ltd v Todd 
1955 3 SA 302 (SR) 304; Mineworkers" Union v Cooks 1959 1 SA 709 (W) 713; 
Broderick Motors Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Beyers 1968 2 SA 1 (O) 4; National Board 
(Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd v Swanepoel 1975 1 SA 904 (W) 911; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14. 
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binding precedent and, if it is, whether it will have the effect of rendering 
the doctrine of estoppel redundant in this context. If the majority decision 
is accepted as binding, the principle of agency by representation which it 
establishes will need to be clarified and developed to ensure that it 
performs a useful and equitable role in resolving agency contract disputes. 
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